How do 3- and 5-year-olds respond to under- and over-informative utterances? by Morisseau, T et al.
promoting access to White Rose research papers
White Rose Research Online
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
Universities of Leeds, Sheffield and York
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
This is the Author's Accepted version of an article published in Journal of
Pragmatics
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/78605
Published article:
Morisseau, T, Davies, C and Matthews, D (2013) How do 3- and 5-year-olds
respond to under- and over-informative utterances? Journal of Pragmatics, 59
(Part A). 26 - 39. ISSN 0378-2166
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2013.03.007
1 
 
 
How do 3- and 5-year-olds respond to under- and over-informative utterances? 
Tiffany Morisseau, Catherine Davies, Danielle Matthews  
 
This paper appeared as: 
Morisseau, T., Davies, C. & Matthews, D. (2013) How do 3- and 5-year-olds respond to under- and over-
informative utterances? Journal of Pragmatics 59 (2013) 26-39 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2013.03.007 
 
Abstract 
 
As children learn their native languages, they come to have detailed expectations about how to refer to 
things. These expectations and the detection of their violations are key to inference-making processes. 
But what do children do when their expectations are not met? Using reaction-time measures and gaze-
direction monitoring in a referential communication task, we investigated whether 3- and 5-year-olds 
notice the infelicity of under- and over-informative utterances and then seek out further information in 
order to recover the speaker’s intended meaning. We tested how children resolve under-informative 
instructions such as ‘‘Find the orange’’ when there is more than one orange in view. We also tested 
whether instructions such as ‘‘Find the cat with a tail’’, in a context where there is only one, normal-
looking cat, would lead them to question why the speaker was over-informative and to seek out further 
information. Both age groups were sensitive to the ambiguous instructions. Only 5-year-olds were 
significantly delayed and more likely to check their interlocutor’s gaze when responding to over-
informative expressions. We discuss how children’s spontaneous motivation to resolve violations of 
expectation, coupled with increased speed of linguistic processing, drives language learning. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As children learn their native language they develop very detailed expectations about what terms might 
be used to talk about a given situation. Indeed, some recent accounts consider this ability to predict 
what will be said given the context to be central to language acquisition (Ramscar et al., 2010). In 
particular, with regard to the development of referential choice, children need to learn to expect 
speakers to produce referring expressions that provide just enough useful information for the hearer to 
identify the referent in question (as adults do:  Ariel, 1988). Recent research has demonstrated that, at 
around 5 years of age, children disprefer both under- and over-informative referential expressions when 
compared to optimally informative equivalents (Davies and Katsos, 2010). However, there is relatively 
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little research indicating how young children act once they detect an infelicitous referential expression. 
Taking action is important for two reasons. First, as language comprehenders (in the moment), children 
need to take steps to accurately ascertain what it is that their interlocutor is talking about (see  Sperber 
and Wilson, 1986/95, for a general theory of this process). Second, as language learners (in the longer 
term), children need to be able to check why people use the language they do in a given situation in 
order to adjust their language model. In this study, we tested whether children detect pragmatic 
infelicities due to under- or over-informativity in a referential communication task (where the 
instructions were always semantically accurate). Of particular interest is whether, and by what means, 
they actively seek out further information in order to recover the speaker’s intended meaning. 
 
1.1. Comprehending under-informative utterances 
 
A vast body of work has investigated children’s comprehension of under-informative expressions. For 
example, Revelle et al. (1985) found that 4-year-olds were able to detect ambiguous messages in a 
referential communication task and generally requested clarification before taking action. The 3-year-
olds in their study, however, lacked verbal strategies for coping with ambiguity, although they exhibited 
appropriate and selective monitoring responses for other kinds of problems such as unintelligible or 
impossible requests (Revelle et al., 1985; see also Flavell et al., 1981). It has been debated whether 
young children can even detect if a request is intrinsically ambiguous, or if they only discover the 
communicative problem if it renders them unable to act, as suggested by Markman (1977, 1981) and  
Robinson and Peter Robinson (1977). Singer and Flavell (1981) investigated the question of how a 
positive versus negative communicative outcome influenced children’s judgments of ambiguity. 5-year-
olds’ but not 7-year-olds’ responses depended on whether the listener said he could not comply with 
the instruction. These results suggest that, during the early school years, children develop the 
awareness that an ambiguous message is intrinsically unclear regardless of the listener’s response to it. 
More recently, Nilsen et al. (2008) found that 4-year-old children show sensitivity to ambiguity from 
another listener’s perspective, even when they possess private knowledge that allows them to resolve 
the ambiguity. This last result was only found when measures of implicit awareness (child’s eye 
movements between possible referents) rather than explicit awareness (request for clarification) were 
taken (Nilsen and Graham, 2012; Nilsen and Fecica, 2011). This raises the question of whether even 
younger children are implicitly sensitive to referential ambiguity. 
 
Evidence from the word learning literature suggests that children have the pragmatic wherewithal to 
detect ambiguity and seek clarifying information from an interlocutor. For example, it is established that 
2- to 4-year-olds check the gaze of their interlocutor in an attempt to establish which of two possible 
objects she is referring to with a novel word (Nurmsoo and Bloom,  2008; see also  Diesendruck, 2005; 
Grassmann et al., 2009). Indeed, even 13-month-old infants check the line of regard of an interlocutor 
more when a novel word is produced with two novel objects in view rather than one (Vaish et al., 2011). 
It is thus possible that young children can exploit indications of the speaker’s epistemic state in order to 
3 
 
resolve ambiguous referring expressions. However, there are several reasons to think that the 
application of these early pragmatic skills to reference resolution in other settings may not be 
straightforward (Matthews et al., 2006). First, the use of a novel word renders the presence of a 
communication gap that needs to be repaired obvious to the child. In contrast, when a familiar word is 
used ambiguously in the presence of two similar objects, resolution is more challenging because it 
requires the child to detect the ambiguity per se. Moreover, when utterances and the contexts they are 
produced in become more complex, the number of inferences a child could draw at any one moment 
increases exponentially. Whereas in a word learning task the child is presented with one novel word and 
one or two objects, in referential communication tasks (and arguably in many everyday interactions), 
children are presented with complex descriptions made up of familiar words and structures (drawn from 
a set of many possible alternative descriptions) and large arrays of objects. It is an empirical question as 
to how children respond to inferences about the speaker’s intent under such circumstances. 
 
1.2. Comprehending over-informative utterances 
 
That a referring expression has to contain enough information to identify a referent is not the only 
expectation one might have regarding the informativity of a sentence: utterances that contain too much 
information are also infelicitous. Although far less research has investigated children’s sensitivity to 
over-informativity, Davies and Katsos (2010) demonstrated that 5-year-olds tend to judge object 
descriptions with redundant adjectives as non-optimal. As a result of this growing expertise, 5-year-old 
children consider the addition of some adjectives to a canonical description to mark a contrastive 
function. For example, Huang and Snedeker (2008) adapted the referential paradigm used by Sedivy et 
al. (1999) and found that 5-year-olds match a modified expression to a target object more rapidly in 
trials containing a contrast set. Likewise, a recent study of 3-year-olds’ adjective comprehension 
suggests that even at this age there is some sensitivity to over-informativity.  Bannard et al. (2013) had 
children observe one adult use a novel adjective to request a toy from another adult (e.g., ‘‘Give me the 
dilsige duck’’). If the use of the adjective was justified by a contrastive motive (e.g., there were two 
ducks in view, one of which was marked), then children were more likely to imitate the use of the 
adjective than if there was no reason to produce it (i.e., because there was only one duck). Thus, 
children as young as 3 years of age were more reluctant to imitate an adjective if they thought its use 
would be over-informative. This is in line with findings that, in simplified contexts, children as young as 2 
years of age tend to avoid producing redundant information in their referring expressions (Matthews et 
al., 2007, 2012). Therefore it seems to be the case that from 3 years of age, children are able to make a 
simple association between the presence of a contrast set and the use of a modified expression (be this 
with an adjective or prepositional phrase). 
 
The question we are interested in is how this sensitivity to over-informativity affects language 
comprehension, that is, how a child responds to the presence of additional information that is not 
relevant to the task at hand given the visual context. In referential communication tasks, over-
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informativity never prevents the hearer from identifying the target object. In this sense, the child does 
not need to repair the utterance to respond correctly to her interlocutor’s instruction. However, as a 
language learner and social partner, the child may generate expectations as to what their interlocutor 
should have said. If the child notices that these expectations are not met, it would be in her interest to 
establish why. But do young children go so far as to seek out additional information (e.g., look for a 
contrasting referent) that would justify the otherwise redundant description? If they do, this would be a 
striking illustration of children’s desire to have a good fit between their predicted language use and 
what they hear around them in order to ensure the success of their communicative interactions. 
 
1.3. Testing children’s response to under- and over-informative utterances 
 
In the current study we looked at the actions children take when a referring expression does not meet 
their pragmatic expectations. Given that, by the age of 3, children are already processing complex noun 
phrases quite rapidly (Fernald  et al., 2010), we predicted that 3- and 5-year-old children would be 
sensitive to both types of infelicities, resulting in longer reaction times and increased gaze checking on 
infelicitous trials. In addition, we predicted that the ability to take action by asking for clarification (in 
the under-informative cases) and visually searching the referential context (in the over-informative 
ones) would be stronger in the older group, presuming that knowledge of how to deal with problematic 
messages increases with age (Sonnenschein, 1982; Lloyd et al., 1998). Furthermore, looking at children’s 
reactions to both under- and over-informative utterances allowed us to test whether individual 
differences in response to these two types of infelicity were correlated. This is currently an important 
question in developmental pragmatics since studies show that children with language disorders do not 
tend to have pragmatic impairments across the board in the way one might expect (Bishop and Adams, 
1991; Norbury et al., 2004; Norbury, in press). This raises the question as to whether common cognitive 
and social-cognitive abilities underlie the processing of different types of referring expression. 
 
3- and 5-year-old comprehenders were asked to move pictures around a grid in order to match a target 
configuration. Children responded to verbal instructions in a 2 (Modification: Modified vs. Non-modified 
instructions) 2 (Contrast: presence of a Contrast set vs. No Contrast) design. Modified instructions 
included a prepositional phrase modification (e. g., ‘‘Move the cat with a tail’’) whereas Non-modified 
instructions did not (‘‘Move the cat’’). The contrast variable refers to the presence of either one or two 
objects in the grid that were potential referents of the head noun. Because a certain level of redundancy 
is to be expected in adult language (e.g.,  Viethen and Dale, 2007; Nadig and Sedivy, 2002), we chose 
prepositional phrase modifications that described a typical feature of the referent. This reduced the 
probability that the modification would be interpreted as being used for descriptive (rather than 
contrastive) purposes (Karmiloff-Smith, 1979:45). That is, from an adult point of view, the prepositional 
phrases we used would be entirely redundant unless there was a contrast object that lacked that 
feature in question. Of course, children are more likely than adults to hear redundant descriptions of 
objects as their caregivers attempt to teach them new words. Nonetheless, based on previous research, 
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we expected even young children to potentially find these descriptions over-informative. Our question 
was what action they would take upon detecting such an infelicity. 
 
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1. Participants 
 
Sixty typically developing, monolingual, French-speaking children participated in the study. There were 
thirty 3-year-olds (15 males and 15 females) with an average age of 3 years 2 months (range = 2;10-3;9) 
and thirty 5-year-olds (14 males and 16 females) with an average age of 5 years 3 months (range = 4;10-
5;9). Within each age group, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two lists, which differed with 
respect to which items were administered in the experimental condition versus the control condition. 
As a result, all children heard the exact same instructions but in different contexts that rendered them 
either felicitous or infelicitous, depending on the list they were assigned to. All children were tested in a 
quiet room at their school in Lyon, France. 
 
2.2. Design 
 
The experiment had a 2 x 2 factorial design. The variable Modification refers to whether the head noun 
referring to the target was modified with a prepositional phrase (Modified condition) or not (Non-
modified condition). The variable Contrast refers to whether the target object was one of two objects of 
the same nominal category in the grid (Contrast condition) or was the only object of its category in the 
grid (No contrast condition). Both variables were administered within-subjects. Crossing these factors 
resulted in four types of critical instructions: 
 
- Under-informative, e.g., ‘‘the banana’’  in a context of there being two bananas (one peeled and one 
unpeeled);  
- Optimal without modification, e.g., ‘‘the train’’  in a context of there being only one train;  
- Over-informative, e.g., ‘‘the cat with a tail’’  in the context of there being only one normal-looking cat;  
- Optimal with modification, e.g., ‘‘the house with windows’’ in the context of there being two houses, 
one without windows.  
 
Items were counterbalanced such that, for the study as a whole, each item was heard equally often as 
optimal and non-optimal. 
 
2.3. Materials 
 
A wooden grid with 16 (4 x 4) slots was fixed on a table and used to present the stimulus pictures, which 
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depicted familiar objects. One slot always remained empty, which allowed the participant to displace 
one object at a time. The colored stimulus images were printed on white cards and placed in plastic 
holders so that they could stand on their own (see Fig. 1). Four sets of cards were created, each 
corresponding to a round of the game. All children completed four rounds and the order of the rounds 
was randomized. Categories of objects (e.g., animals or toys) were balanced across the rounds. 
 
Each set of cards was created such that the grid contained two key contrast sets and two key singletons. 
For the purposes of counterbalancing, two versions of each set were created differing only in terms of 
two items such that a key singleton in version 1 became a member of a contrast set in version 2 and vice 
versa. As mentioned above, participants were randomly assigned to one of two lists. Experimental items 
that were under- or over-informative for participants assigned to list 1 were control (optimal) items for 
participants assigned to list 2 and vice versa. Thus, differences observed between conditions could not 
be due to the instruction being inherently odd. The remaining items in each set of cards were the same 
across subjects, and they were always referred to in an optimal way, whether they were singletons or 
part of a contrast set. The critical contrast object was always located in the grid right next to the target 
object. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Example of experimental set-up. 
 
2.4. Procedure 
 
Children were tested individually. The experimental session took place during normal class time, which 
children left one at a time to participate in the experiment, and lasted approximately 20 min. Children 
sat at the table in front of the grid. Paper hands were placed on the table and children were asked to 
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put their hands on the paper hands to show they were ready before each trial. This ensured that 
reaction times (time taken to move the hand from the table to a slot in the grid) would be measured 
from the same point for all trials. The distance between the edge of the table and the grid differed 
between the two age groups due to height differences. Their data sets are thus analyzed separately. The 
experimenter was seated near the left side of the table, so that the child would have to turn her head 
45° to look at her. A Logitech webcam (QuickCam Vision Pro 9000) was placed at 90° to the grid on the 
same side of the table, at a distance such that it captured both the grid and the child. In this way, both 
hand movements and looks to the experimenter could be recorded. 
 
Children were told that they were going to play a game with instructions that can be glossed in English 
as follows: we are going to play a game together in which you will have to move objects around this 
grid. The goal is to move these objects so that the grid becomes exactly the same as the one shown in 
this booklet. For each trial, I will tell you which object to move, and you will pick up the correct object 
and put it in the slot that remains empty. After you are finished with one object, you must always put 
your hands on the paper hands in front of you’’. 
 
In a warm-up phase, children heard three instructions, all of which were optimal. If necessary, the 
experimenter would help the child by showing her the target object, the empty slot or where to put her 
hands after the trial. 
 
The test phase consisted of four rounds, each including four critical instructions (one item for each of 
the four types of critical instructions) and five fillers (all of which were optimal). Instructions to move 
objects within each round were exactly the same across subjects and uttered in the same tone and in 
the same order. The experimenter uttered her instructions while looking at the printed grid she kept in 
her hands, and then looked at the child until she had chosen a card (i.e., she did not look at the target 
object). 
 
In the case of under-informative instructions, there was no ‘right’ response (as two objects were 
potentially being referred to, one of which was arbitrarily termed the target for data analysis purposes). 
If the child asked for clarification, the experimenter answered with the initial instruction adding in the 
relevant modifier. If a child picked up one of the objects that met the description without asking for 
clarification, the experimenter treated this as a correct response. Some children did not ask for 
clarification verbally but did so by looking continuously at the experimenter as if for further information, 
sometimes without having selected any object, sometimes after having touched one of the objects that 
met the description. Looking at the experimenter without picking-up an object was considered an 
attempt to express inability to respond to the instruction. In such cases, the experimenter waited three 
seconds before completing her request with the relevant modification. Finally, if the child had difficulty 
finding where to put the target object, the experimenter would give her details about the location of the 
empty slot. The full list of instructions for each grid is presented in  Appendix 1. In a tidy-up phase, after 
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the completion of each round, the child was invited to help the experimenter put away the pictures. 
During this phase, while all the cards were still visible, the experimenter asked the child to name the 
four items that had been referred to with critical instructions (two infelicitous and two control 
instructions), by saying ‘‘Quelle est cette carte?’’ (‘‘What is this card?’’). This allowed us to check 
whether children would reproduce the infelicitous descriptions they had heard or spontaneously use an 
optimal description. 
 
2.5. Coding 
 
Off-line coding was conducted using the multimedia annotator ELAN, developed by the Technical Group 
of the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics (Lausberg and Sloetjes, 2009). 
 
Each test trial was coded according to whether or not the child reacted verbally and whether or not she 
looked at the experimenter. Reaction times to pick up the target object were also measured. 
 
Gazes to the experimenter were coded from the offset of the instruction to the moment the child’s 
hand left the grid after putting the object in the target location (gazes that could have been interpreted 
as an indication that she was ready for the next instruction were thus not included). Verbal comments 
were fully transcribed. 
 
Children’s reactions to under-informative instructions were coded as clarification requests either when 
the child explicitly asked ‘‘Which one?’’ or when she expressed her inability to respond to the 
instruction by looking intently at the experimenter without picking-up any object. Other cases where 
children looked (briefly) at the experimenter were coded as gaze checks. 
 
Reaction times to pick up the target object were measured for all of the 16 experimental items (one 
over-informative, one under-informative and the two corresponding controls for each of the four grids) 
from the offset of the instruction to the moment the child’s hand left the grid holding the object. In the 
Non-modified condition, trials with a clarification request from the child were not included in the 
reaction time analysis. In the Modified condition, children sometimes reacted before the end of the 
sentence (‘‘false starts’’) and we removed these trials from the reaction time data. 53 trials (out of 210) 
for the 3-year-old group and 25 for the 5-year-old group were discarded on this basis. 
 
Finally, children’s descriptions in the tidy-up phase were transcribed and coded as either modified or 
non modified. Data for the item ‘‘the clock with hands’’ were removed because five of the 3-year-old 
subjects experienced difficulties in understanding the description and finding the corresponding target 
object. 
 
To test for the reliability of the first author’s coding, 10% of the data (90 trials) were randomly selected 
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for re-analysis by a trained assistant. Intercoder percentage agreement was 100% for verbal responses 
and gaze checks and Cronbach’s a reliability coefficient reached .99 for reaction times. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
The children were motivated to play the game and generally responded attentively during all trials. 
 
We consider the children’s reactions first to under-informative trials and then to over-informative trials 
using three measures: (1) requests for clarification (in the Non-modified condition) or comments (in the 
Modified condition); (2) gaze checks to the Experimenter and (3) reaction times. Reaction times elicited 
by 3- and 5-year-olds were not comparable because the distances between the grid and the children 
were not the same for the two groups (the position of the grid was adapted to the size of the children). 
For ease of interpretation, then, reaction time data for the two groups were treated separately. 
Reaction times were log-transformed to reduce skew in their distribution. We also looked at the 
spontaneous production of adjectives in the tidy-up phase. Finally, we explored whether individual 
differences in children’s responses to the two trial types were associated with each other. 
 
Because they were binary variables, we analyzed clarification requests, gaze checks and adjective 
production data using mixed-effect logistic regression, which treated the experimental factor of 
condition (Contrast vs. No Contrast) as a fixed effect and subjects and items as random effects (Jaeger, 
2008). Reaction time data were analyzed using linear mixed-effect regression (Baayen et al., 2008). 
 
 
3.1. Effects of under-informativity 
 
When instructions were optimal, no clarification requests were observed for either age group.  Fig. 1 
presents the distribution of clarification requests for each age group in the under-informative condition. 
Both tended to elicit clarification verbally (70% of 3-year-olds’ and 78% of 5-year-olds’ clarification 
requests were verbal, with the remainder being achieved by persistently looking at the experimenter 
until she clarified herself). To assess whether children of each age group were significantly more likely 
to request clarification in under-informative compared to optimal trials, we fitted a mixed-effect logistic 
regression model to the clarification request data.  Table 1 shows that the effect of age on the number 
of clarification requests was significant, with 5-year-olds asking for clarification for a mean of 2.4 out of 
the 4 under-informative trials (in this age group, 83% asked for clarification at least once) compared to a 
mean of 1.1 request by the 3-year-olds (in this age group, 53% asked for clarification at least once). 
 
A more subtle index of the child’s sensitivity to under-informative instructions was the number of gaze 
checks to the experimenter in trials with no clarification request.  Fig. 3 presents the proportions of 
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trials where the child gaze checked the experimenter as a function of Modification, Contrast and Age 
group. Focusing on the non-modified instructions, 3-year-olds gaze checked the experimenter in 16% of 
under-informative trials with no clarification request and in 10% of control trials (respectively 6% and 
0% for the 5-year-olds). The results of the mixed-effect logistic regression (see Table 2) showed that 
children were significantly more likely to gaze check their interlocutor when the instruction was under-
informative rather than optimal, and that 3-year-olds relied significantly more on gaze checking overall. 
 
The last index of sensitivity to infelicity that we considered was reaction times. We tested whether, on 
trials with no clarification request, children nonetheless showed any signs of slowing in response to 
infelicity. Means of log-transformed reaction times to instructions in the optimal and under-informative 
conditions were compared (there were199 observations for the 3-year-olds and 129 observations for 
the 5-year-olds). As noted in the method, only trials with no clarification request were included in the 
analysis. Thus, some children (those who asked for clarification in all under-informative trials) do not 
appear in the analysis (2 in the 3-year-old group and 10 in the 5-year-old group).  Fig. 4 shows that 5-
year-olds took more time in responding to non-optimal instructions for which they did not ask for 
clarification (mean log-transformed RTs = 1.134 compared to 0.799 in the optimal condition).  Table 3 
summarizes the model results and shows that this effect of condition was significant for the 5-year-old 
group. No such difference was observed among the 3-year-old group, suggesting that if children did not 
ask for clarification, they probably did not notice the contrast. 
 
Table 1 
Results of mixed-effect logistic regression model for number of clarifications. 
Non-modified condition (nb of obs: 240) 
Random effects  Variance Std dev 
Subject (intercept)  4.146 2.036 
Item (intercept)  0.000 0.000 
    
Fixed effects Coefficient Odds ratio z-Value 
Intercept 0.652 1.919   1.466 
Age (three) -2.310 0.099 -3.589*** 
Null model likelihood ratio test: x2(1) = 11.877, p < 0.001. 
* p < 0.05.  
** p < 0.01.  
*** p < 0.001.  
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Fig. 2. Distribution of clarification demands in response to under-informative instructions. 
 
 
3.2. Effects of over-informativity 
 
Five children (all 5-year-olds) verbally noted the oddness of an instruction at least once when it was 
over-informative, for example by saying ‘‘Il y a un autre X?’’ (‘‘Is there another X?’’). Since they always 
did so after having selected the target object, we did not exclude those trials from analyses of reaction 
times. 
 
The logistic regression results for Modified instructions shown in Table 2 indicate that mean numbers of 
looks to the experimenter did not differ according to the felicity of the instruction across both groups. 
The 3-year-olds gaze checked significantly more often than the older group across conditions (16% of all 
trials, compared to 7% for the 5-year-olds. See Fig. 2). The interaction between the two variables was 
not significant. 
 
Mean log-transformed reaction times in the modified condition are presented in  Fig. 5. Again, separate 
mixed effects regression models (with Condition as a fixed effect) were tested for each age group 
because reaction times elicited by the two groups were not comparable. As can be seen in Table 3, 5-
year-olds were significantly slower to respond when the instruction was over-informative than when it 
was optimal (mean log-transformed RTs to over-informative trials = 1.095 compared to 0.872 in the 
optimal condition). However, no such model fitted the data satisfactorily for the 3-year-old group. It is 
possible that the presence of a contrast set made it more difficult for the children to resolve the 
referring expression. 
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Fig. 3. Proportions of trials where the child gaze checked the Experimenter as a function of Age, Instruction and 
Presence/Absence of contrast set. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
 
 
Table 2 
Results of mixed-effect logistic regression models for number of gaze checks. 
Non-modified condition (nb of obs: 376) 
Random effects  Variance Std dev 
Subject (intercept)  1.123 1.060 
Item (intercept)  0.508 0.713 
 
Fixed effects 
 
Coefficient 
 
Odds ratio 
 
z-Value 
Intercept -5.183 0.006  -6.394*** 
Condition (under-inf.) 0.999 2.715 2.222*   
Age (three) 2.243 9.421 2.831** 
 
Null model likelihood ratio test: x2(2) = 18.727, p < 0.001. 
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Modified condition (nb of obs: 420) 
Random effects  Variance Std dev 
Subject (intercept)  0.745 0.863 
Item (intercept)  0.050 0.223 
Fixed effects Coefficient Odds ratio z-Value 
Intercept -2.895 0.055 -7.494*** 
Condition (over-inf.) -0.204 0.815 -0.618 
Age (three) 1.109 3.031 2.583** 
Null model likelihood ratio test: x2(2) = 7.413, p = 0.024. 
*p < 0.05.  
**p < 0.01.  
***p < 0.001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Log-transformed mean reaction times as a function of Age and Presence/Absence of contrast set for Non-
modified instructions. NB: data only include trials where the child did not ask for clarification. *p < 0.05; **p < 
0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
Table 3 
Results of mixed-effect linear models for 5-year-olds’  log-transformed reaction times. 
Non-modified condition (nb of obs: 129) 
Random effects  Variance Std dev 
Subject (intercept)  0.021 1.146 
Item (intercept)  0.000 0.000 
Residual  0.137 0.371 
 
Fixed effects 
 
Coefficient 
 
Odds ratio 
 
t-Value 
Intercept 0.799 2.223 15.16*** 
Condition (under-inf.) 0.328 1.388 4.807*** 
 
Null model likelihood ratio test: x2(1) = 21.431, p < 0.001. 
 
Modified condition (nb of obs: 185) 
Random effects  Variance Std dev 
Subject (intercept)  0.034 0.186 
Item (intercept)  0.018 0.134 
Residual  0.153 0.391 
 
Fixed effects 
 
Coefficient 
 
Odds ratio 
 
t-Value 
Intercept 0.873 2.394 12.067 *** 
Condition (over-inf.) 0.215 1.240 3.663*** 
Null model likelihood ratio test: x2(1) = 12.977, p < 0.001. 
*p < 0.05.  
**p < 0.01.  
***p < 0.001.  
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Fig. 5. Log-transformed mean reaction times as a function of Age and Presence/Absence of contrast set for 
Modified instructions. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
 
Table 4 
Results of mixed-effect logistic regression models for adjective production in the tidy-up phase. 
Non-modified condition (nb of obs: 480) 
Random effects   Variance Std dev 
Subject (intercept)   0.000 0.000 
Item (intercept)   0.077 0.277 
 
Fixed effects 
 
Coefficient 
 
Odds ratio 
 
z-Value 
Intercept  -5.253    0.005 -5.081*** 
Condition (under-inf.)  3.146 23.242 3.019** 
Age (three)  -0.613 0.542 -1.314 
Null model likelihood ratio test: x2(2) = 25.103, p < 0.001 
 
Modified condition (nb of obs: 420) 
Random effects  Variance Std dev 
Subject (intercept)  0.000 0.000 
Item (intercept)  0.054 0.232 
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Fixed effects Coefficient Odds ratio z-Value 
Intercept             -1.938 0.144 -6.612 *** 
Condition (over-inf.)             -0.385 0.680 -0.968 
Age (three)             -1.438 0.237 -3.036** 
Null model likelihood ratio test: x2(2) = 12.363, p = 0.002. 
*p < 0.05.  
**p < 0.01.  
***p < 0.001.  
 
 
3.3. Children’s production of referring expressions during the tidy up phase 
 
Overall, children rarely used modification in this phase of the study, when asked to name the objects 
(see Table 4).1  In the Non-modified condition, only the presence of a contrast led children to specify 
the adjective: children never spontaneously used a modified description when it would have been over-
informative. No significant difference between age groups was observed (7 and 14 trials with adjective 
production respectively in the 3- and 5-year-old groups, out of 240 trials). In the Modified condition, the 
number of adjective productions differed by age group (6 and 23 trials with adjective production 
respectively in the 3- and 5-year-old groups, out of 210 trials) but no significant difference was 
observed between cases where it was optimal and cases where it was not. 
 
3.4. Individual differences on under- and over-informative trials 
 
It was interesting to consider whether children who were sensitive to one type of infelicity tended to be 
sensitive to the other. An index of individual sensitivity to infelicity in both modified and non-modified 
conditions was calculated, using the difference between numbers of either gaze checks or verbal 
reactions to critical instructions (under- and over-informative) and their respective controls. No 
significant correlation was observed in either group: Spearman’s r(3835) = 0.09, p = .64 for the 3-year-
olds and r(4889) = 0.177, p = .43 for the 5-year-olds. 
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
The goal of this developmental study was to investigate how preschoolers’ expectations of informativity 
affect language processing. We were interested in whether children would take action when confronted 
with messages that do not meet their expectations. To summarize, we found that both 3- and 5-year-
                                                          
1
 NB: because there was no trial with adjective production in the non-modified condition, we dealt with the 
problem of testing zero variance components by adding one positive trial for the purpose of the analysis. 
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olds were sensitive to under-informative utterances and looked to the experimenter to resolve the 
ambiguity. The 3-year-olds sought clarification (either verbally or by looking intently at the 
experimenter until she provided a clarification) on just over a quarter of trials, whereas the 5-year-olds 
did so roughly twice as often. Also, both age groups gaze checked the experimenter significantly more 
often when her instructions were under-informative compared to when they were optimal. Even on 
trials where they did not request clarification, 5-year-olds slowed down significantly in response to 
ambiguous instructions. They were also significantly slower to respond to over-informative utterances 
than optimal ones of the same length, whereas the younger children showed no sensitivity to over-
informative utterances. In line with our assumption that 5-year-olds were slowed down because they 
had made a contrastive inference, five children in this age group went so far as to comment on the 
infelicity of over-informative instructions. When it came to producing their own descriptions in the tidy-
up up phase, children rarely produced modified expressions. When they did so with items that had been 
in the non-modified condition, it was always because there was a contrast object. Finally, children’s 
performance on under- and over-informative trials did not appear to be related. 
 
The findings for under-informative utterances build on those showing that 4-year-olds are able to 
detect ambiguity albeit implicitly (cf.  Nilsen et al., 2008). Studies from the language learning literature 
suggest that sensitivity to ambiguity is present well before age 3, and in some simple cases by 13 
months (Vaish et al., 2011). In these word-learning tasks, though, the detection of ambiguity relies on a 
more obvious gap between the message (a novel word) and the speaker’s meaning. Our results show 
that this ability can also apply earlier than previously thought in a referential task that requires the 
hearer to detect the ambiguity even when a possible candidate fitting the description is available from 
the child’s point of view. Thus, as they get older, children become increasingly aware that messages, 
whatever their source, can be problematic, and they acquire a growing knowledge of how to deal with 
them, including the fact that sometimes seeking clarification is necessary. 
 
Sensitivity to the over-informative instructions in this task was even more demanding because the 
infelicity did not prevent the child from responding accurately to the instruction. Contrary to other 
experimental set-ups used in the literature on contrastive inferences, the modification in our task was 
post-nominal. By using pre-nominal adjectives, researchers have been able to demonstrate children’s 
ability to make use of the presence of a contrast set in order to resolve a referring expression more 
rapidly (e.g.,  Huang and Snedeker, 2008). Here, children could accurately identify the referent with the 
information conveyed by the head noun. Thus, any contrastive inference processed afterwards was 
purely gratuitous. Yet, 5-year-olds responded significantly more slowly to over-informative instructions 
than to the exact same message when given under optimal conditions. In doing so, they demonstrate a 
solid grasp of how much information they expect to be used to describe a target, and deviations from 
these expectations are strong enough to generate slower reactions. In several cases this violation even 
warranted a verbal comment, clearly demonstrating that they understood that modification implied 
contrast and that they wished to understand why the speaker had used such an expression (see also  
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Shwe and Markman, 1997, for an example where the child corrects a listener’s misunderstanding of 
what he himself has said). 
 
How can we explain these behaviors? In our everyday environment, some features are more relevant to 
mention than others because they are unusual (or ‘‘unpredictable’’) as opposed to predictable features, 
like the yellow of a banana (Sedivy, 2003). For instance, mentioning an unpredictable feature can be 
relevant because the speaker wants to help the hearer identify the target or merely to stress the fact 
that the object possesses an unusual feature. In contrast, no contextual feature would normally justify 
the use of a highly predictable adjective other than the presence of a contrast object (an atypical one 
that did not possess this typical feature of the regular object).  Sedivy (2003) demonstrated that people, 
including children, spontaneously make a contrastive inference only when the adjective is highly 
predictable. The instructions used in our over-informative trials contained modifications that described 
a typical feature of the referent exclusively (thus highly predictable for children who have gained a 
minimal level of conceptual knowledge about the target objects). Since the target objects were all 
familiar to young children, the presence of a contrast object in the grid was the only good reason that 
could justify the speaker’s choice to use such predictable modifier. In the control condition, this 
contrast object was next to the target object and thus readily accessible. We therefore interpreted the 
longer reaction times observed among 5-year-olds in the over-informative condition as evidence of 
children’s attempt to make sense of the over-informative description. Most probably, this result would 
disappear if we used less predictable adjectives. 
 
In our introduction, we assumed that by 3 years of age, children were generally quite capable of 
drawing contrastive inferences in simple settings. In Clark’s terms, they know that ‘‘every two forms 
contrast in meaning’’ (Clark, 1987). Therefore, the question of why 3-year-olds did not slow down in 
response to over-informative utterances needs addressing. Of course, we cannot exclude the possibility 
that the source of the 3-year-olds’ troubles may have been methodological. For example, a lack of 
effect might be due to the number of relevant objects in the over-informative trials (a unique object of 
its type) compared to the matched control trials (two objects of the same type). We might expect young 
children to take longer in the control trials with two objects because they need to discriminate between 
two potential targets. Thus, the 3-year-olds may simply have spent more time on this discrimination 
task in the control condition. Given these methodological limitations, the performance of the 5-year-
olds is all the more striking. 
 
Another potential explanation for the 3-year-olds’ performance is that, even though they spontaneously 
used non-modified expressions to describe unique objects, they did not have strong expectations about 
how the object was supposed to be referred to and so they could not contrast their expectations with 
what was said. 5-year-olds may have stronger expectations to this regard, such that if they are not met 
they will infer something to the effect of ‘‘if she said that, she must have a reason’’ (see  Gergely et al., 
2002, for an example of such reasoning in a non-linguistic test). It is further reasonable to assume that 
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the strength of expectation is related to the degree of pragmatic tolerance a child demonstrates (Katsos 
and Bishop, 2011). Another possibility, consistent with the reaction time findings, is that the younger 
children lacked sufficient cognitive resources to rapidly process the complex description. Children who 
did not detect the infelicity may have processed the head noun (which sufficed) and located the target 
before they processed the redundant information (either at all or in any depth). In this sense they 
would not even have noticed the infelicity. Such an explanation might also explain inverse frequency 
effects found in tests of children’s anaphora resolution (Matthews et al., 2009). 
 
Finally, the fact that 3-year-olds relied more heavily on gaze checking (they used it more often than 5-
year-olds across conditions) is of interest because it signals a difference in children’s relation to verbal 
instructions, with 3-year-old children seeming less confident in their responses2. Looks to the 
experimenter in such situation can indeed be interpreted as an attempt to monitor one’s action under 
the experimenter’s guidance. The issue of whether the speaker’s status played a role in the way 
children reacted to the instructions (in both under- and over-informative cases) should be considered 
here. Following the hypothesis of Sonnenschein (1986), it is possible that child comprehenders attribute 
a certain amount of intelligence and language ability to the experimenter, relative to their own. In 
Sonnenschein’s study, the age of the speaker (child vs. adult) had an effect on children’s evaluations of 
non-informative messages. When the child’s procedural rules for this evaluation were either lacking or 
unstable, adults’ messages were evaluated more positively than peers’. It might thus be the case that to 
some extent, the hierarchical situation prompted children to act automatically without questioning 
relevance in the context (cf. Grodner and Sedivy, 2011). As they get older, children’s confidence in the 
norms of language use allows them to be more demanding of their communicative partners, regardless 
of their status or presumed knowledge. 
 
In sum, the study shows that between 3 and 5 years of age, children increase their sensitivity to 
infelicities of both types, making particular advances in their reactions to over-informative utterances. 
However, while most 5-year-olds clearly found both over- and under-informative utterances non-
optimal, there were substantial individual differences in each condition. It is interesting to note that it 
was not the case that children who tended to respond to under-informative utterances by a gaze check 
or a verbal response were the same ones who tended to respond in the same way to over-informative 
utterances. This suggests that sensitivity to pragmatic infelicity can be piecemeal in nature. A larger 
sample size would be required to say anything definitive about individual differences, however. We 
assume it is probably the case that common features underlie these two cognitive abilities. In the adult 
psycholinguistic literature, it has been found that individuals with lower self-reported pragmatic abilities 
had a lower standard of relevance, to the extent that they were less likely to draw pragmatic inferences 
based on linguistic stimuli (Nieuwland et al., 2010) and were less likely to do well on the communication 
                                                          
2
 NB: although it is difficult to draw conclusions from the comparison of 3- and 5-year-olds’ eye-gaze data due to 
multiple factors involved, the difference in the number of gaze checks between conditions within each age group 
remains relevant for our purpose. 
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subset of the ASQ questionnaire (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Further studies are needed to determine 
whether individual differences in terms of social competence are linked with performance in such 
referential tasks and, in the case of too much information, what makes them go as far as trying to 
explain the infelicity by looking for a contrast object. 
 
In any case, by 5 years of age, most of the children in this study had developed clear expectations about 
the amount of information that a referring expression should include, and, if these expectations were 
not met, they sought information that would explain why not. It is precisely this curiosity that will allow 
them to make ever more fine-grained inferences as they become adult-like language users. 
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Appendix 1. Instructions 
 
Grid 1 
L’avion gris (the gray airplane); La fleur avec des pétales (the flower with petals)**; La jupe (the skirt); 
La tortue (the turtle); Le vélo (the bike)*; L’avion rouge (the red airplane); Le ballon (the balloon)*; Les 
gants (the gloves); Le cheval avec des oreilles (the horse with ears)**. 
 
Grid 2 
La moto orange (the orange motorbike); L’horloge avec des aiguilles (the clock with hands)**; La 
chemise (the shirt); Le mouton (the sheep); L’oiseau (the bird)*; La moto multicolore (the multicolor 
motorbike); La pomme (the apple)*; Les lunettes (the glasses); La voiture avec des roues (the car with 
wheels)**. 
 
Grid 3 
La framboise (the raspberry); Le chat avec une queue (the cat with a tail)**; Le pull (the sweater); Les 
bottes violettes (the purple boots); La banane (the banana)*; Le stylo (the pen); Le train (the train)*; Les 
bottes roses (the pink boots); La maison avec des fenêtres (the house with windows)**. 
 
Grid 4 
La fraise (the strawberry); Le bateau avec une voile (the boat with a sail)**; Les chaussettes (the socks); 
Les ciseaux bleus (the blue scissors); La poule (the hen)*; Le manteau (the coat); La chaise (the chair)*; 
Les ciseaux noirs (the black scissors); L’arbre avec des feuilles (the tree with leaves)**. 
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The items marked with * are experimental items for the under-informative condition for half subjects, 
and control items for the under-informative condition for the other half. Subjects who were 
administered the item ‘‘bike’’ as an experimental item, were also administered the items ‘‘apple’’, 
‘‘train’’ and ‘‘hen’’ as experimental items. Subjects who were administered the item ‘‘balloon’’ as an 
experimental item, were also administered the items ‘‘bird’’, ‘‘banana’’ and ‘‘chair’’ as experimental 
items. 
 
The items marked with ** are experimental items for the over-informative condition for half subjects, 
and control items for the over-informative condition for the other half. Subjects who were administered 
the item ‘‘flower’’ as an experimental item, were also administered the items ‘‘car’’, ‘‘cat’’ and ‘‘tree’’ as 
experimental items. Subjects who were administered the item ‘‘horse’’ as an experimental item, were 
also administered the items ‘‘clock’’, ‘‘house’’ and ‘‘boat’’ as experimental items. 
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